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Abstract 
Blockchain is highly adaptable and enables distributed transaction logging through its 
cryptographic underpinnings, making it an attractive technology for diverse suppliers and 
acquisition integrators. Supply chain tracking using blockchain must, however, support 
updates to item records throughout the life cycle—including repair and carcass tracking 
within Depot Level Repairable (DLR) and back into operation. Unmanned systems, 
additive manufacturing of parts, and version-control of software updates are all 
exemplars related to the supply chain requiring addition, deletion, updating, and 
mergence of a wide array of records. This raises the question of how to build and 
integrate an integrity-protected item history record that is updateable regardless of when 
or where changes may occur. We call this approach to updateable record management 
blockchain mergence and investigate how item tracking can be achieved throughout the 
full item life cycle, even under intermittent connectivity of deployed assets in combat 
environments. We demonstrate blockchain mergence through an interweaving of dual 
chains—an authenticated local history signature chain and a global blockchain—and 
apply it to an unmanned aerial system repair case. Blockchain mergence offers 
significant opportunities for distributed decentralized trust among diverse producers and 
consumers of both materiel and information, ashore and afloat. 
Background 
Blockchain has been widely researched for applications due to the technology’s 
ability to support consensus among distributed participants. The chain is, by design, 
required to be a single, forward path of events; if branches appear, the chain consensus 
ensures that all but one branch is discarded (Zheng et al., 2017). A supply chain, in 
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comparison, particularly on the production side, is a reversed architecture. In this case, 
small parts are used to build larger parts, hence requiring a form of mergence (e.g., a 
final ready-for-use vehicle is comprised of multiple smaller parts sourced from various 
vendors, manufacturers, and even countries). Blockchain, according to its current 
design, fundamentally disallows this. Assuring supply chain integrity and visibility 
requires an adaptation of blockchain use to allow for the mergence that the original 
concept was not designed to handle. Such adaptive blockchain solutions provide new 
capabilities and support the potential for future manufacturing changes. 
Approach 
We survey existing blockchain solutions for forms of mergence, that is, solutions 
for merging chains into a single blockchain, such as would be necessary for supply chain 
assurance. 
We analyze potential solutions using partner signatures (where supply chain 
partners commit to chain addenda by digitally signing new blocks while also committing 
to the entire previous chain). This requires analysis of security considerations based on 
different commitment variants. Furthermore, it requires consideration of potential time 
lines and time line collisions of block production. 
The above solutions are evaluated with respect to formal blockchain integration. 
In particular, we investigate whether mergence of distributed ledgers is possible within 
exiting blockchain architectures or if it is feasible as a parallel assurance mechanism, 
such that commitments are uploaded to an existing blockchain. This evaluation will be 
made on mathematical feasibility as well as use case comparison. 
Current Research on Ledger Mergence 
Blockchain technology has been often touted as a solution to various challenges 
since its inception under Bitcoin and cybercurrency. An interesting question is how 
blockchain technology might benefit Navy logistics. In essence, blockchains are a list of 
records, or blocks, cryptographically linked as a distributed ledger for recording 
transactions among parties in a permanent and verifiable way (Zheng et al., 2017). 
Blockchain might also support “smart contracts,” which may be a way to reduce the 
administrative friction associated with honoring requirements across a large enterprise.  
The hallmarks of a robust Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) are 
decentralization between blockchain networks and the individual nodes in those 
networks, as well as the consensus reached when validating individual blocks when 
added to a network’s blockchain ledger (Khan, 2019). Khan (2019) also noted that 
characteristics such as the number of transactions per second (TPS) that a network can 
process, the network’s scalability, and how a particular network guards against malicious 
attempts to add false information are also key to a good system. 
We focus on authentication of changes at the micro-level, with transparency in a 
ledger for support of supply chain assurance. Industry is working on a number of efforts 
involving supply chain logistics and supply chain management (SCM)—such as 
Hyperledger (2020), Everledger (2020), and Ethereum (2020)—that may have an 
application to the Navy’s logistical systems and perhaps could contribute to an agile 
logistical system. The central challenge is applying such efforts beyond acquisitions to 
the whole life cycle of the supply chain. 
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A Quick Look at DLT Then and Now 
Nakamoto (2009) is considered the conventional originator of the original 
description of blockchain technology, although it is focused on the financial and Bitcoin 
applications. One should note, however, that the concepts surrounding blockchain 
predate this by a decade or so, and there is other research available on distributed 
ledgers before that time frame. Beyond Bitcoin, DLT and blockchain have been 
researched for various financial and operational tracking purposes. Zheng et al. (2017) 
and Natarajan et al. (2017) provided a general and fairly informal introduction into DLT 
and how it might integrate into mainstream day-to-day operations in the financial, 
private, and government sectors. Natarajan et al. (2017) also provided a sense of how 
“decentralized records of flow of commodities and materials across a supply chain by 
using trusted stakeholders to validate flows and movements” could benefit those 
stakeholders, lending credence to adopting DLT, which would enhance trust in the 
supply chain. For an overview of blockchain research, we point to Fosso Wamba & 
Queiroz (2020), which highlights the benefits of the creation of value in operations and 
supply chain management (OSCM). Statistics such as the number of published papers 
by country, topic, keyword summary, and relationships are recorded.  
Although not explicitly addressing blockchain technology, Bonanni (2011) 
discussed supply chain discovery/awareness, concepts and concerns that motivate our 
work. Bonanni argued for “Radical Transparency” in the context of sustainable (carbon 
cost) supply chains, carbon-footprint measured supply chains, and product life cycle 
awareness and optimization. This runs into a similar problem set that Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition may encounter—companies’ unwillingness to reveal their 
supply chain details as trade secrets, or an inability to do so because the companies are 
unaware of the source of their sources. 
There has also been a line of research covering direct application of blockchain 
to SCM. Korpela et al. (2017) provided an analysis of how blockchain could be used to 
solve or ameliorate the issues of concern of the major stakeholders involved in a very 
large supply chain operation. The main contribution of the paper is the proposed 
elimination of a third party to mediate/handle supply chain inter-business and then 
address these popular concerns. Meanwhile, Banerjee (2018) provided an 
overview/summary of the use and benefits of blockchain in supply chain operations, 
such as 
• reduced counterfeiting and origin tracing 
• digital product details/life cycle 
• custom-built provenance solutions: Software service providers can use 
the blockchain framework to build provenance solutions for its customers 
(permission blockchain) 
Based on Banerjee’s work, custom-built solutions appear to have gained traction 
within industry. For instance, Infosys has developed a product provenance solution using 
Oracle Blockchain Cloud Services that is based on Hyperledger Fabric. Infosys has also 
developed a coffee bean tracking provenance solution for its customers. Such examples 
point towards a demand for custom-built provenance solutions that can be developed 
with product- or industry-specific validations. It is important to note that the concept of 
provenance only functions when all the supply chain stakeholders are part of the 
blockchain network. The architecture of blockchain inherently traces products as they 
pass from one supply chain entity to another. These transactions are stored as blocks 
and chronologically linked according to the physical movement of “the goods.” 
Supporting such tracking technologies motivates our solution (see the section titled A 
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Ledger Mergence Either in Blockchain or as a Module Approach Leveraging Existing 
Blockchain Solutions). 
Kshetri (2018) provided a theoretical framework related to key objectives of SCM. 
Kshetri’s work covers several corporate case studies of how the Internet of Things (IoT) 
blockchain SCM can be used by companies with differing levels and areas of interest in 
supply chain verification/source confidence (see Table 1). Such case studies, including 
the Chipotle E. coli outbreak ingredient tracing case study, may shed light on potential 
parallel solution behaviors involving a faulty/compromised hardware component recall in 
the DoD. Under a similar formal goal, Queiroz and Fosso Wamba (2018) covered 
blockchain SCM adoption in the United States and India. The study advocated for 
drawing on emerging literature on blockchain, supply chain and network theory, and 
technology acceptance models (TAMs). Queiroz and Fosso Wamba (2018) introduced a 
model based on a slightly altered version of the classical unified theory of acceptance 
and the use of technology (UTAUT).  
 
Table 1. Cases Selected and Their Classification in Terms of Incorporation of the IoT and 
Deployment of Blockchain to Validate Individuals’ and Assets’ Identities (Kshetri, 2018) 
 
 
A Method for Adapting Distributed Ledger for Supply Chain Use 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Use Case: Systems Deployed by U.S. Navy Ships 
Littoral combat ships (LCS) have two classes of relatively small surface warships 
designed for operations near shore by the U.S. Navy (“Littoral combat ship,” n.d.). 
Modern designs allow for flexible mission execution, various mission payloads, and other 
tasking. Reduced crew complements mean individuals are assigned yet with reduced 
inventories of spare parts and supplies. 
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The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) help in this regard. These vehicles 
are employed for scouting and other rapid response detailing that minimize risk to the 
overall mission, ship, and crew. The ecosystem for a typical UAV consists of four 
categories of components: 
• hardware: airframe, sensors, computers 
• software: communication, guidance and control 
• additive manufacturing (AM): 3D printed wings, tails and other small parts 
for ad hoc repair 
• information: keys, training, repair instructions, feedback, safety 
Within these four categories of components, each is different and necessary for 
aggregation into a complete device, and each has different stakeholders and supply 
chains feeding ships’ supplies. Thus, four parallel supply chains of interest exist, and 
each is interdependent; therefore, any mergence solution should necessarily support all 
four aspects, as seen in Figure 1. Note that even with acquisition of a device as a single 
unit, the nature of updates, potential repairs, and parts reuse between devices imply that 
it must be possible, for tracking purposes over the device lifetime, to handle the 
mergence of all four aspects. 
System Constraints and Requirements Identification 
In this section we explore the various system requirements in the context of the 
UAV use case. 
Scenario: UAV Deployment, Repair, and Operations 
Suppose that a ship deploys with stock gear and consists of two distinct yet 
similar versions of a UAV. The ship must maintain its current pace of operations until 
return to port or resupply. 
Under normal operations, the following issues may affect device history—in that 
they impact the integrity of the device or its trustworthiness—and, therefore, should be 
added in an authenticated manner to the device history: 
• software updates  
• training and safety updates to ship tactics, training, and procedures (TTP) 
and standard operating procedures (SOP) 
Now suppose that a collision occurs during testing between the two UAVs, 
causing damage to each vehicle. The following may also be important changes to the 
device history, requiring authenticated changes in device records: 
• hardware replacements on board, including classified components 
• 3D printing for upgraded tail assemblies 
• maintenance feedback to shore commands 
Any mergence solution must, therefore, support per minimum such a variety of 
changes to the item history. 
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Figure 1. UAV Operational Assembly and Modification 
 
Mergence Requirements Assessment: Verifiability 
In addition to the aforementioned types of item record changes, there are also 
requirements in how a change is recorded. In particular, the record must be verifiable. In 
terms of verifiability, the following requirements are also essential and must be 
supported by a mergence solution: 
• conformation that a given component X is on the ship 
• conformation of all devices in the inventory that have X as a component 
• conformation if and when X has been replaced/repaired and so on within 
a particular device 
• conformation of the change entity—the responsible party to 
change/split/remove/combine X as a component within devices 
• ability to add logs or metadata  
The above requirements emerge from use case issues. For example, if a device 
component is found to be compromised and must be removed, the logged data 
associated with the device should indicate if it has been removed and by whom. 
Furthermore, it is important for administration purposes to identify all possible devices 
containing the compromised component for swift handling and damage mitigation. In 
these contexts, “components” may refer not only to hardware but also malicious software 
or poorly executed AM (e.g., 3D printed wings with vulnerable integrity). 
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Mergence Requirements Assessment: Flexibility 
Finally, we list flexibility requirements associated with mergence. Since 
mergence solutions must support potential external (industry/non-DoD) supply chain 
tracking of unpredictable natures, the mergence solution must be fairly adaptable. 
Furthermore, external supply chain tracking may differ from internal (DoD) tracking, and 
the potential solution must support one or more blockchains used internally to the DoD. 
As many acquisition devices may be of a sensitive nature, the mergence solution must 
furthermore support various classification levels, such that unclassified devices may be 
administered in unclassified environments, while devices of higher classification levels 
can also be managed within the same mergence solution without sensitive information 
leakage. Finally, in addition to all of these, devices transfer hands between 
organizations, ships, and so on, requiring a flexibility to record management. This leads 
us to the following final four solution requirements: 
• flexibility independent of source/industry in the external supply chain 
• flexibility with internal blockchains(s) within the DoD 
• flexibility with classification levels 
• flexibility for device transfer between organizations, ships, and so on 
internally 
Ledger Mergence Either in Blockchain or as A Modular Approach Leveraging 
Existing Blockchain Solutions 
There is a natural separation between external-DoD and internal-DoD supply 
chain tracking. This intrinsically leads to a dual solution, with the acquisition boundary 
denoting a change in authenticity tracking. Even for internal supply chain tracking, 
satisfying all solution requirements appears, on the outset, to be impossible. Notably, a 
solution that crosses classification boundaries must be carefully handled, especially for 
full item records and tracking information. We handle this by further separating out the 
internal DoD authentication chain into two parts. 
External and Internal Chains 
DoD equipment is typically procured via outside commercial manufacturing 
vendors. The supply chain starts outside of the DoD, where parts and other equipment 
must be verified and validated before becoming available inside internal supply chains. 
Conceptually, manufacturers may require supply chain assurance as well, tracking 
purchased components for integration in building devices. This may take the form of 
various blockchains (see Figure 2). Minimally, manufacturers may be required to present 
verification on the types and sources of a device’s components. At acquisition, a new 
item record will be formed, such that the component history of the acquired device is 
verified and authenticated by the acquisition authority, who registers components under 
a digitally signed genesis block. Once a genesis block for the internal ledger is formed, 
tracking may proceed internally.  
What is essential at the DoD boundary/component registration step is the actual 
verification of internal components to a device. Information on processing chips, 
software, and so on must be recorded. This enables future tracking such that if, for 
instance, a component is later discovered to be compromised in the manufacturing 
chain, all devices containing the critical component can be identified. The genesis block 
thus serves as an initial registration for all components, such that it is only necessary to 
record changes to that initial list within the device history record.  
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Figure 2. DoD Acquisition: Verification of External Input Chains(s), Registering of Devices 
to Initiate Internal Chains 
 
Mergence Operations 
We break internal tracking into two further chains to support classification 
boundaries. The device chain handles immediate time history and authenticates records 
as visible to the admin. Moreover, the device chain is designed to support the current 
Depot Level Repairable (DLR) system. Within the mergence solution, in addition to the 
device chain, we also support one or more internal blockchains. These may be 
organization level blockchains or classification level blockchains. Here we employ the 
term blockchain for a distributed immutable ledger, without specification that restricts to 
any particular ledger format or consensus method. This in turn meets the flexibility 
requirements specified in the section of this paper titled System Constraints and 
Requirements Identification. 
We are motivated to show how blockchain technology might be applied to handle 
the full range of potential fleet resupply maintenance and modification requirements. We 
define the following device chain operations, in accordance with system requirements, 
as the fundamental primitive operations that together provide the general coverage 
necessary for distributed accountability of system modifications: 
• device registration: adding a new, original item to a ledger. This creates 
the genesis block for the device chain. 
• device repair: adding a new component onto an existing device. This 
differs from device combine in that the component being added has no 
registration history (i.e., no genesis block). This may occur if the repair 
takes place using AM. 
• device split: separating components within an existing device. This 
supports potential reuse or disposal, such as when a component breaks 
and is removed from the current item record (device history is still 
maintained). This creates two separate device chains: one for each split 
component.  
• device combine: integrating two components into a new combined device. 
This supports customization of devices after acquisition and parts 
replacement (e.g., a newly purchased component added to an existing 
device). 
Device split can be employed if a device breaks but components can be reused. 
For example, suppose that a UAV (UAV1) malfunctions, but certain components can be 
used to repair another UAV (UAV2). The broken device would then have a device split 
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operation in its item record, creating two new chains: one for the component that will be 
reused and one for the remaining unusable assembly UAV1. A device combine 
operation then integrates the split component into UAV2. As such, the item history of 
UAV1 is now linked to UAV2. If there were relevant repairs to the reused component or if 
it comes to light that the reused component was compromised during manufacture and 
must be pulled from use, it will be immediately clear from UAV2’s record history that the 
part now resides within UAV2 instead of the UAV1 device carcass. 
Each of the stated operations must be authenticated. For this, we use the public 
key infrastructure (PKI) already inherent in the DLR system. The operator responsible for 
the device signs the various operations. The signature covers the current record for the 
device(s) being operated on as well as what type of operation is performed. The 
authenticated transcript is stored as part of the device chain. These operations are 
shown in Figure 3. 
The distributed ledger and shared memory exist beyond the immediate device 
chain history, such that an item record cannot be changed a posteriori. For this we 
employ a blockchain, which records the signatures from the device chain operations. 
Note that we only require the signatures, and not the related device information, to be 
stored on the blockchain, although the latter may be stored also. Storage of further 
information or metadata may be beneficial for device tracking but could also leak 
information (such as if the device or its location is sensitive). Instead, we require the 
minimum information on the blockchain concerning the current signature state.  
 
 
Figure 3. Sequencing Operations for Blockchains 
 
Multilevel Security Classification Agility Considerations 
For hybrid devices used in the fleet, activities may occur and be needed across 
multiple levels and domains of security, such as UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, 
SECRET, and TOP SECRET. For this, we map our solution to the multilevel security 
(MLS) classification system and demonstrate interoperability. 
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Note that while a distributed chain contains data blocks of potentially classified 
information, the information sent to the blockchain is comprised of merely the signature 
on the data rather than the data itself; any further additions are optional. Even with a 
time code associated to the signature object representation, there is no intrinsic value to 
the information outside of the context of the signed data, especially with a plentitude of 
blockchain transactions. Thus, the blockchain information can be shared across MLS 
systems since these codes are useless to an attacker without corresponding ledger 
(database) access. 
In addition to the above observation, we can also allow for blockchains operating 
at different classification levels, such that more relevant device information than merely 
the signature may in fact be added to the blockchain. This in turn implies that any device 
may have a record with varying classification levels attached to different aspects of the 
associated information and that the associated data may be placed on the relevant 
blockchain. Naturally, higher classification can correlate same- and lower-level data 
records, but not write to them, per the properties of the MLS system. Figure 4 illustrates 
this framework in practice. 
 
Figure 4. MLS Classification Agility Within a DoD Blockchain Network 
 
To consider how this may work in practice, we walk through the following 
conceptualized steps for handling the mergence solution of device chains and 
blockchains within MLS: 
1) A new item genesis record for an UNCLASS device is created for the 
device chain. This correlates to a device origin record with signature 
information populated to the various blockchains. 
2) The device is transferred from an UNCLASS environment to a SECRET 
environment. The device chain is now maintained at SECRET. 
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3) The device is repaired, using a combine operation on the device chain. 
Necessary information is populated to the appropriate and corresponding 
SECRET level blockchain, while other chains record signature information 
only. 
If it is later discovered that the device of interest contained a malfunctioning or 
compromised component (e.g., through manufacturer notification), then an operator 
might inspect all associated components in the device genesis block, recognizing that 
the critical component is present. It can then be seen that the device was associated to a 
different classification (or organization blockchain), and the appropriate authority for that 
blockchain can be contacted, who can then trace the device’s history to identify if the 
component is still present or has been replaced. 
DOD Equipment Repair Transactions Using the Hyperledger Fabric Framework for 
Distributed Blockchain Ledger Keeping 
Using the open-sourced Hyperledger Fabric framework (Hyperledger, 2020) 
hosted on GitHub (2020), we have constructed a case study exemplar using open-
source software and demonstration records that shows how various repair level 
organizations might use blockchain mergence solutions to record supply chain 
transactions between participants using blockchain as a distributed ledger technology.1 
UAV Camera 
For our case study, we have an organizational level (O-level) end user that 
currently possesses a UAV that houses a camera subcomponent, a DLR that requires 
repair at the depot level (D-level). The client application transactions that take place and 
are recorded on the blockchain ledger are 
1. O-level issues the nonfunctional DLR camera to D-level for repair 
2. D-level accepts and conducts the required repairs for the DLR camera 
3. D-level reissues the repaired DLR camera back to O-level 
The intent is to show chain of custody for the DLR camera subcomponent, 
camera metadata (i.e., serial number), and status of repair of the DLR in the supply 
chain. The blockchain network (N) is comprised of the following consortium 
organizations, components, and entities (illustrated in Figure 5): 
• Organizations R1 (D-level), R2 (O-level), and R4 (blockchain network 
administrator). 
• Client applications A1 (D-level transactor) and A2 (O-level transactor). 
Client applications conduct transactions on behalf of their respective 
organizations. 
• Certificate authorities CA1, CA2, and CA4. Each organization can prefer 
their own vetted certificate authority. 
• Peers P1 (D-level) and P2 (O-level). Peers maintain local copies of and 
record blockchain ledger transactions in accordance with agreed upon 
smart contracts (chaincode) within the consortium. 
• Blockchain ledger L1. Each peer maintains and communicates with other 
network peers to ensure local blockchain ledger copies are kept uniform 
throughout the network. 
• Smart contract (chaincode) S5. Peers are able to maintain blockchain 
ledger uniformity through consortium member agreed upon smart 
contracts. 
 
1  Details can be found at https://gitlab.nps.edu/tdnorbra/blockchain-mergence    
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• Network ordering service O4. The ordering service serves as the initial 
administrative gateway between consortium members upon network 
standup. 
• Network configuration NC4. Consortium members R1, R2, and R4 all 
agree upon the blockchain network configuration policies administered by 
ordering service O4 via NC4. 
• Channel configuration CC1. The channel configuration allows for network 
peers to accept and distribute blockchain ledger transactions between 
authorized organizations in accordance with NC4. 
• Channel 1. The communications channel where organizational peers 





Figure 5. DoD Equipment Repair Blockchain Network (N) Configuration Topology 
 
Using the Fabric Test Network 
We apply the Hyperledger Fabric test network for our case study test 
benchmarking (Hyperledger, 2020). Depending on the operating system of the 
developer’s choice, a specific environment may first be set up on a local machine to 
leverage the Hyperledger Fabric framework. Once the prerequisites are complete, the 
test network is invoked via command line scripts and the demonstration can proceed. In 
our case, the demonstration code was modified locally to mimic our UAV camera 
scenario. 
DLR Transactions in Action 
The codebase and a demonstration video for this contribution is maintained in 
open-source version control, located on the Naval Postgraduate School’s GitLab server 
(Norbraten, 2020). In particular, we trialed the following case study stages: 
1. Upon network standup/startup, the various organizational peers, admins, 
and so on are defined, registered, enrolled, and assigned certificate 
authorities, which then issue authenticating certificates for each 
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respective network node. The agreed upon smart contract (chaincode) is 
deployed to each organizational peer node and tested. Finally, each 
organizational peer node is given local custody of the blockchain ledger, 
which is then readied for acceptance and recording of ledger 
transactions. 
2. The network facilitates transactions. Each client application (authorized 
organizational transaction entity) submits their authentication data to the 
network before the network authorizes the transaction to take place.  
3. Finally, the network is operational, and authorized organizational entities 
are recognized. Transactions may begin, but only those that are 
delineated in the smart contract (an O-level entity submitting a UAV 
camera to D-level for repair). We run three example transactions, as per 
the smart contract constructs initiated from each of the O-level and D-
level authorized entities. These transactions are initiated from each client 
gateway interface application that has knowledge of the network from 
their respective remote locations.  
Basic Network Timing Data 
For any system component introduction, computational expense is valuable to 
assess. We performed distributed ledger testing on commodity hardware, and delays 
were tolerable once system initialization was complete. Table 2 below annotates various 
local network timing data benchmarks for tests performed. Experiments were run using a 
2015 Apple MacBook Pro laptop with a 3.1 GHz dual-core Intel i7 and 16 GB of RAM 
running the latest macOS operating system. 
 
Table 2. Network Timing of Various DLR Transactions on Network (N) 
Network Action Time Units 
Blockchain Network Startup/Standup 2 min 19 sec 
Client Application Authentication 19.4 sec 
 O-level DLR Issue Transaction 18.3 sec 
D-level Acceptance/Receipt ACK of DLR 17.8 sec 
D-level Reissue of RFI DLR 18 sec 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The span of device life cycle and rapid evolution from design to development, 
prototype testing, requirements approval, acquisition testing, deployment, casualty 
response, and system upgrades is immense. Automated authentication and change 
logging within this life cycle support human-mediated checkpoints. Industry is looking to 
blockchain solutions for supporting the ecosystem, which opens an opportunity for 
leveraging the technology for parts tracking within the DoD. Blockchain mergence 
provides a bridge between local device repairs and blockchain integrity. In essence, it 
builds on the DLR system with similar fine-grain parts replacement and carcass tracking 
by means of hard-coded integrity stamps on the blockchain as a defense against 
adversarial or even undesired but accidental changes to a device’s logged history.  
We investigated the logistics challenges that a blockchain mergence solution 
must address, including pre- and post-acquisition concerns, procedural modifications, 
preventative and corrective maintenance, and field repair. Furthermore, we evaluated 
potential solutions against fundamental requirements for interoperability, such as with 
the existing DLR system and MLS. Finally, our initial open-source, Hyperledger Fabric–
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based simulation of the refined blockchain mergence solution demonstrates proof-of-
concept capabilities by applying a widely used industry software library for blockchain 
configuration, simulation, and confirmation. 
Recommendations for Future Work 
This proof-of-concept exemplar work is ready for further development to match 
the full logistics life cycle. A real-world prototype case study emulating multiple 
participants (ashore hardware suppliers, operational forces, and unmanned systems with 
hardware-dependent software updates) might further test and demonstrate necessary 
capabilities and ledger distribution. Using the preexisting CAC infrastructure for 
individual identification further enables a full, ready-to-test blockchain mergence solution.  
System engineering assessments can include potential augmentation of existing 
systems to better support the increased requirements accompanying the fast-growing 
deployment of unmanned systems. Use case considerations may also be assessed for 
trusted deployment and updates to hardware and software, as well as inclusion of 
additive manufactured parts. Future work might then emulate the full life deployment 
cycle for a fleet-critical system of interest to explore operational parallels in data-centric 
security for human–machine tactical deployments. 
The blockchain mergence solution is designed for smooth integration with the 
existing DLR system. Feasibility testing of the combined system comprised of blockchain 
mergence, with the DLR system, and CAC infrastructure is a logical next step for future 
work.  
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